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Abstract
The introduction of the euro generated substantial interest in the impact of currency unions (CUs) on trade
ﬂows. Initial estimates suggested a tripling of trade, which gave rise to a literature in search of “more
reasonable” CU effects.Theoretical derivations of the gravity model highlight, however that the CU litera-
ture neglects to control simultaneously for general equilibrium effects (multilateral resistance) and
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity among trade partners. Once we introduce the appropriate controls, CU
trade effects are shown to range around 50%. We also highlight that the practice of reporting average CU
effects generates misleading results. The average effect is shown to be a composite of disparate individual
CU effects ranging from 40% (euro) to about 100% (Central African franc).
1. Introduction
The advent of the euro generated keen interest in quantifying currency unions’ (CUs’)
impact on trade. Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) estimated that CUs triple
bilateral trade with other currency union members. Such increases seemed question-
ably high and gave rise to an entire literature comprised of alternative approaches
designed to “shrink the Rose effect.” Rose and Stanley (2005) surveyed the literature
and reported that subsequent papers with similar samples still report CU trade effects
that exceed 100%. Baldwin’s (2006) theoretical derivation of the gravity model high-
lights that the CU literature neglects to control simultaneously for general equilibrium
effects (multilateral resistance) and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity among trade
partners.Large panel studies of CU effects in the tradition of Rose (2000) that include
these necessary controls simultaneously do not exist.
Previous approaches to controlling for multilateral resistance included geography-
based remoteness (Rose, 2000) and country ﬁxed effects (Rose and van Wincoop,
2001), which neglected changes in general equilibrium effects over time.
1 Below we
outline theoretically and empirically how coefﬁcients are affected by omitted variable
bias when comprehensive multilateral resistance controls are absent from the analy-
sis. As importantly, Baldwin (2006) highlighted the omitted variable bias introduced
when the empirical strategy does not account for unobserved determinants of bilat-
eral trading relationships.
2 Failure to include the adequate ﬁxed effect controls leads
to such severe bias that Baldwin recommends ignoring any other estimates for policy
purposes.
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) implemented the two crucial sets of simultaneous
controls advocated by Baldwin (2006) in a small panel of EU countries and found
either negative or zero trade effects of the euro.
3 Frankel (2010) revisited Rose
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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd(2000) in a large panel of countries, but controlled only for unobserved bilateral
heterogeneity.
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Here we provide a revised benchmark for CU trade effects by simultaneously
addressing all methodological issues raised by Baldwin (2006) and by updating and
extending Rose’s (2000) panel dataset to cover 50 years and 117 countries. We also
address an issue that has not been appropriately emphasized in the CU literature:
previous studies focus on one average CU effect, but trade effects may differ dramati-
cally depending on the speciﬁc CU. With the exception of Nitsch (2002) and Frankel
(2010), this heterogeneity has not been investigated. Not only does the omission of
individual CU effects introduce potential omitted variable bias,but for policy purposes,
average CU trade effects are uninformative. For instance, the trade effects of the euro
should not be indicated by a coefﬁcient that is a mix of euro, Central African franc
(CFA), and East Caribbean Currency Union effects.
We posit that all three aspects—multilateral resistance, country-pair ﬁxed effects,
and individual CU effects—must be introduced simultaneously in order to eliminate
bias to CU trade effects. First we show that Rose’s (2000) average CU trade effect
remains statistically and economically signiﬁcant once we control for the proper ﬁxed
effects speciﬁcation.The effect is, however, reduced to a more realistic 52%.
5 Then we
highlight how dramatically the trade effects differ across the individual CUs, with a
strong, positive effect equivalent to a 40% trade increase for the Eurozone countries,
and over 100% trade increases for CFA countries. Other CUs show no effect,
however, including the East Caribbean Currency Union and hub-and-spoke CUs, in
which the spoke country adopts a major world currency. Finally we note that pref-
erential trade agreements (PTAs) produce generally greater trade effects than CUs—
with the exception of Europe, where euro trade effects challenge those produced by
the common market.
2. Data
Our dataset is based on Subramanian and Wei (2007), who in turn derived their data
from Rose (2004). Our dataset ranges from 1950 to 2000 and represents a signiﬁcant
expansion of Rose’s (2000) 1970–1990 data. Rose (2000) featured 22,948 observations
(330 in CUs) and we have 76,081 observations (1224 in CUs),177 countries,and 16,941
bilateral trade relationships. The increased size of the sample is important because it
covers more countries in CUs: 330 observations in Rose (2000) vs 1224 in our dataset.
Our dependent variable is bilateral imports at ﬁve-year intervals,deﬂated by the US
consumer price index. A number of CU studies employ the average of imports and
exports as the dependent variable,to reduce measurement error (e.g.Rose,2000;Rose
and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2002). Recent approaches favor our unidirec-
tional trade data,which is more closely aligned with theoretical implications and allows
for proper multilateral resistance controls.
We expand the original Subramanian and Wei (2007) dataset to include a compre-
hensive set of explanatory variables suggested by the previous literature. First, we
augment the dataset to include a large list of major PTAs obtained from Ghosh and
Yamarik (2004).
6 Second, we add information on individual CUs as reported by Glick
and Rose (2002).Third,we update the CU variable to include more recent CUs.Fourth,
we include a currency board (CB) dummy and split it into arrangements that peg to the
US dollar (CBusdmxt) and the D-mark/euro (CBeuromxt).Fifth is the addition of controls
that are frequently encountered in the CU literature, which include current/historical
colonial relationships as well as common languages/territories/borders. Sixth, we
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ences in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and population density), based on
the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. Finally, we add bilateral exchange rate volatility,
which is computed from the Interntional Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial
Statistics using Ghosh and Yamarik’s (2004) methodology (the standard deviation of
the ﬁrst difference in the bilateral exchange rate in the previous three years). Regres-
sions including foreign exchange (FX) volatility reduce the dimension of the dataset to
66,619 observations with 15,833 pairs starting in 1960. The appendix tables in the
working paper version of this study (Eicher and Henn, 2009) summarize membership
in CUs, CBs, and PTAs, other explanatory variables, and country coverage of the
dataset.
3. Empirical Implementation of the Gravity Model
Baldwin (2006) leveled two fundamental critiques against recent empirical imple-
mentations of the gravity equation. His arguments are best understood by following a
theory-based derivation of the gravity equation based on Anderson (1979) and Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003). Baldwin (2006) started with the trade expenditure share
identity to derive a version of the gravity equation that relates bilateral imports Vmxt at











The numerator illustrates that “size” of trading partners (proxied by Em or Ex)
“attracts” more bilateral trade, akin to Newton’s Law of Gravity. Greater bilateral
trade costs tmxt, however, reduce bilateral imports (as s > 1 for substitutes). The
denominator contains multilateral resistance terms for exporters and importers that
represent these countries’ openness to the rest of the world. Formally, Δmt k kt mkt n ≡∑
− τ
σ 1
is the importer’s trade costs with k global trading partners for n varieties, while the
global cost/demand index for the exporter nation is ΩΔ xt xt kt kt E =
− τ
σ 1 .
Equation (1) clearly shows that both changes in bilateral trade costs (for example,
countries m and x join a CU) and changes in multilateral trade costs (e.g. country k
changes tariffs across the board) affect the bilateral trade relationship Vmxt in general
equilibrium. Time-varying multilateral resistance controls are thus necessary to avoid
bias.Otherwise changes in multilateral trade costs may be falsely attributed to changes
in bilateral relationships (e.g. formation of a CU).
Bilateral trade cost can be disaggregated to highlight its individual determinants:
τ
σ
mxt mx mxt mxt mxt mxt F Distance CU CB PTA Z
1− = [] ,,, , . (2)
Aside from transport costs (proxied by distance), currency arrangements, and PTAs,
trade costs are determined by a vector of regressors Zmxt that controls for countries’
“natural” inclinations to trade with each other. Variables commonly included in Zmxt
are bilateral exchange rate volatility FXvolamxt, current and historical colonial
relationships CurColonymxt and EverColonymx, respectively, common colonizer
post-1945 ComColonizermx, shared ofﬁcial languages ComLangmx, as well as territorial
dependencies and contingencies ComNatmx and Bordermx, respectively.
It is difﬁcult to specify an exhaustive Zmxt vector, since some bilateral characteristics
may be unobservable.
7This is the origin of Baldwin’s (2006) second criticism:whenever
Zmxt is not comprehensively speciﬁed, the gravity equation is immediately subject to
ONE MONEY, ONE MARKET:A REVISED BENCHMARK 421
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltdomitted variable bias. Therefore, the gravity equation must contain not only time-
varying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects but also country-pair ﬁxed effects, which
control for all time-invariant unobservables in bilateral trade relationships. The
absence of country-pair ﬁxed effects is not usually due to oversight on the part of the
researcher. Especially in the CU literature, the paucity of observations that represent
countriesentering/exitingCUsmayrendertheintroductionoftheseeffectstoorestrict-
ive in small datasets.Our dataset instead proves sufﬁciently large to provide signiﬁcant
results.
The third methodological aspect that we address relates to the distinct trade effects
of individual CUs and PTAs.If PTAs and CUs do not generate identical trade beneﬁts,
estimating an average coefﬁcient using a catch-all CU or PTA dummy introduces bias
not only to bilateral trade costs (equation (2)) but also to the multilateral resistance
terms (equation (1)).A large literature has documented that trade effects of individual
PTAs and CUs differ drastically.
8 Hence,we allow not only for individual PTAs but also
examine results for individual CUs in our analysis below.
4. Multilateral Resistance and the Trade Effects of Currency Unions
Our empirical strategy proceeds in stages. We ﬁrst introduce controls for multilateral
resistance; then we include the additional ﬁxed effects to address unobserved bilateral
heterogeneity. This sequential approach allows us to examine the marginal impact of
each set of controls on the CU coefﬁcients.
Multilateral resistance controls have long been part of the CU literature.Rose (2000)
included a time-invariant “remoteness” term to proxy for multilateral resistance. Rose
and van Wincoop (2001) included country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and reduced Rose’s
(2000) CU trade effect from 235% to 136% in the process.The Rose and vanWincoop
(2001) strategy sufﬁciently addressed multilateral resistance in a cross-section;
however,the paper did not capture the time-varying nature of trade costs in panel data.
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) addressed this issue by including time-varying ﬁxed
effects,but ﬁnd either zero or negative trade effects of the euro in a small dataset.Here
we establish a new revised benchmark for a large panel by estimating (1) and (2)
according to


















10 11 . (3)
Equation (3) includes time-varying ﬁxed effects for importers dmt and exporters lxt to
address multilateral resistance. Note that these ﬁxed effects absorb country-year
speciﬁc regressors, such as importer and exporter expenditures Emt and Ext, which are
proxied by GDP in canonical gravity equations. Equation (3) is easily extended to
account for individual CUs, CBs, and PTAs by converting b1, b2, and b3 to coefﬁcient
vectors  β1,  β2, and  β3 representing membership in individual arrangements.
Regressions (1)–(3) in Table 1 present our baseline results for CU trade effects with
multilateral resistance controls. Regression (1) can be directly compared with Rose’s
(2000) benchmark regression except for the addition of multilateral resistance con-
trols.
9At 0.65,the CU coefﬁcient estimate is roughly six standard deviations lower than
Rose’s original 1.21.This reduces the CU trade increase to 91% (ª e
0.648 - 1) as opposed
to Rose’s tripling estimate (the 235% increase). The estimate is also signiﬁcantly
smaller than Rose and van Wincoop’s (2001), who did not consider the time-varying
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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltdnature of multilateral resistance. Their estimate of 0.86 (implying a 136% increase)
settles right between ours and Rose’s (2000).
Regressions (2) and (3) allow for individual CU and PTA effects.Regression (2) ﬁrst
introduces all PTAs included in Rose’s (2000) PTA dummy; then regression (3)
expands the set of PTAs to those considered by Ghosh andYamarik (2004).One reason
put forth to exclude individual PTAs from CU studies is that CU and PTA membership
may overlap,particularly in Europe (see e.g.Frankel,2010).This overlap,however,does
not justify their exclusion. Rather, by the very same reasoning, the exclusion of indi-
vidual PTAs introduces omitted variable bias to CU estimates. Even if CU and PTA
membership generated multicorrelation, and therefore the standard errors of PTAs
and CUs were inﬂated, coefﬁcients resulting from their simultaneous inclusion are
nevertheless the best linear unbiased estimates. In our dataset, we ﬁnd that potentially
inﬂated standard errors are not a serious problem for statistical signiﬁcance. Most of
the individual CUs and PTAs are estimated with sufﬁcient precision to infer statistical
signiﬁcance even when included in tandem.
Regressions (2) and (3) show the importance of splitting the catch-all CU dummy
into the individual CU arrangements. Individual CU trade effects differ substantially
from each other and from the average trade effect estimated in regression (1). Conse-
quently, individual CUs improve ﬁt considerably throughout: Convincing evidence is
provided by the relevant F-statistics, and by CU and other estimates’ robustness and
signiﬁcance across speciﬁcations.
Large and signiﬁcant effects for individual CUs exist for the African CFA and for
(mostly extinct) hub-spoke arrangements represented by CUothermxt. Regressions (2)
and (3) show that trade within the African CFA zone is estimated to be 197–224%
higher than trade with outsiders. The hub-spoke arrangements of CUothermxt show a
similar trade increase of 157–183%. CUs involving the British pound, US dollar, and
East Caribbean dollar show no statistically signiﬁcant effects.
The trade effect of the euro is the surprise in this set of results.In regression (2),our
estimated euro trade increase (46% ª e
0.381 - 1) is substantially smaller than effects of
other CUs and the CFA in particular.Moreover,the euro effect even turns insigniﬁcant
when the European EconomicArea (EEA) is included (regression (3)).The formation
of the EEA in 1994 extended the EU’s Common Market to most members of the
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and deepened European trade integration.
Regression (3) suggests that subsequent trade ﬂows were mainly affected by PTA-
based integration and hardly by the formation of the Eurozone. These results
underscore the importance of including a comprehensive set of individual PTA
dummies when estimating CU effects.
A counterintuitive result in regression (3) is negative trade creation of the main
European PTA—the EU. The EU instituted far-reaching integration by removing
border controls and harmonizing the entire spectrum of public policy; the resulting
reduction in transaction costs should have augmented trade volumes. This predicted
negative EU effect, however, is well understood in the literature (see e.g. Linnemann,
1966;Aitken,1973;Pollak,1996;Rose,2004;Baldwin 2006).Dating back to Linnemann
(1966), the gravity equation has been known to over-predict trade systematically for
large, geographically proximate country pairs. Europe-speciﬁc variables thus tend to
pick up the negative residuals resulting from proximate European countries’ under-
trading relative to gravity model predictions. Since the EU variable most closely
resembles a Europe dummy,its coefﬁcient turns negative in regressions (2) and (3).This
negative coefﬁcient indicates the omission of crucial variables that would help the
gravity equation predict intra-European trade correctly.This omission is not surprising:
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country pairs, multilateral resistance controls cannot remedy the issue. That is, the
negative EU effect alerts us that the empirical approach is missing crucial unobserved
bilateral heterogeneity controls.We add these controls in section 5.
5. Benchmark Trade Effects of Currency Unions: Accounting for
Multilateral Resistance and Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity
In this section, we add country-pair ﬁxed effects to control for any relevant unobserv-
ables in bilateral trade relationships. The estimates presented in this section thus
account for the most comprehensive set of controls for omitted variable bias and are
the most policy-relevant. As outlined in the introduction, either multilateral or unob-
served heterogeneity among trading partners has been addressed by previous CU
papers. Here we account for both effects simultaneously to provide a revised bench-
mark of Rose’s (2000) results. In a CU context, only Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) have
undertaken such a simultaneous approach before—on a small dataset of roughly 4000
recent observations (that does not overlap with Rose (2000)). The size of the dataset
matters because the inclusion of comprehensive ﬁxed effects reduces the number of
degrees of freedom substantially.By adding country-pair ﬁxed effects to (3),we obtain
our new estimation equation:
log Imports CU CB PTA
FXv
mxt mx mt xt mxt mxt mxt ( ) =+ + + + +
+
αδλ β β β
β
12 3
4 o ola CurColony mxt mxt mxt ++ βε 5 . (4)
All time-invariant pair-speciﬁc variables are now absorbed into the country-pair ﬁxed
effects amx.
10
In large trade datasets, the estimation of three-way ﬁxed effect structures as in (4) is
computationally demanding.
11 Despite the growing interest of labor economists in
analyzing three-way error component models since Abowd et al. (1999), only three
papers exploit this setup in a gravity context aside from Baldwin and Taglioni (2006).
Baltagi et al.(2003) also provided strong economic and statistical arguments in favor of
our proposed three-way error components model. They, however, motivate the time-
varying importer and exporter dummies with business cycles and country-speciﬁc
political and institutional conditions rather than omitted price terms.Eicher and Henn
(2011) exploited the methodology in a large dataset to test for the trade implications of
regionalism and multilateralism. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) chose the three-way
structure as their preferred technique to address possible endogeneity problems.
Regressions (4)–(6) in Table 1 present the estimates based on equation (4). The
F-statistics overwhelmingly conﬁrm the importance of country-pair ﬁxed effects.More-
over, regression (4) already reveals that we previously attributed much of “naturally”
occurring trade to CUs. At 53% (ª e
0.42 - 1), the average CU effect has about halved
and differs by more than two standard deviations from our previous estimate of 91%
(regression (1)).
12 The 53% estimate is statistically signiﬁcant but dramatically lower
than the 123% (ª e
0.80 - 1) reported by Glick and Rose (2002, Table 5). Their paper
features country-pair ﬁxed effects but no time-varying multilateral resistance controls.
By disaggregating CUs and PTAs in regressions (5) and (6), we ﬁnd that individual
CU estimates are signiﬁcantly reduced compared to regressions (2) and (3).The excep-
tion is again the trade effect of the euro. It turns positive now after accounting for
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and will be discussed further below.Again we show
that catch-all dummies masked highly heterogeneous individual CU and PTA effects.
The estimates for hub-spoke CUs involving the British pound or US dollar remain
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signiﬁcant but show reduced trade impact. In percentage terms, their effects halve to
97% and 73%, respectively. The CU coefﬁcients in regressions (4)–(6) reveal exclu-
sively the time-series impact of CU accessions and exits and thus constitute the policy
relevant measure we seek.
The euro is the only CU for which trade effects become both larger and more
signiﬁcant when we add unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls. This supports
Baldwin’s (2006) hypothesis that non-euro CUs carry essentially zero informational
content for euro trade effects, because these CUs’ members differ dramatically from
eurozone countries. Our preferred regression (6) shows that the euro increased trade
by about 40% (ª e
0.34 - 1).The magnitude of our preferred euro estimate is comparable
to those of Barr et al. (2003) and Bun and Klaassen’s (2002) long-run estimates.
Interestingly, Persson (2001) produced results almost identical to ours (a 44% trade
increase) using a matching estimator to control unobserved country-pair heterogeneity.
However,his estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant.Using a similar matching technique,
Chintrakarn (2008) produced a 14% effect of the euro.Our estimate is also higher than
those of Micco et al.(2003),Flam and Nordstrom (2003) and Bun and Klaassen (2007),
who used dramatically shorter panels covering fewer countries. Except for Flam and
Nordstrom (2003), none of the cited studies simultaneously controlled for pair hetero-
geneity and multilateral resistance.We will explain below that much of the CU effect
accrues post-accession, hence the shorter time periods may produce smaller effects.
As expected, country-pair ﬁxed effects also provide a remedy for the negative EU
effect since they correct for“natural”trade levels in Europe.Therefore,the EU dummy
can now reﬂect a 25% (ª e
0.22 - 1) increase in trade and the EEA trade effect is about
57% (ª e
0.449 - 1). The impact of the euro, at 40%, eclipses the EU effect. However,
EEA, which extended the common market to some non-EU member countries from
1994 onwards,is also estimated to have had a 57% trade-enhancing effect.Thus,Europe
managed to amalgamate CU and PTA-based integration during the 1990s to reap
substantial trade beneﬁts.Outside of Europe,however,PTA effects are generally larger
and more precisely estimated than effects of CUs covering similar countries.
It is notable that FX volatility shows no signiﬁcant impact on trade throughout.
Currency boards are signiﬁcant when aggregated (regression (4)) but insigniﬁcant
when disaggregated (regressions (5) and (6)). This may be due to an insufﬁcient
number of observations in the presence of multiple ﬁxed effects. These fragile FX
volatility and currency board effects are in line with the recent empirical literature on
the subject (see,e.g.Clark et al.,2004).To some degree the result is to be expected,since
the theoretical literature indicates that FX volatility generates ambiguous trade effects
in general equilibrium (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2000). Remaining control vari-
ables for geography, culture, and colonial history are stable, signiﬁcant, and of the
expected magnitudes.
Accession Dynamics
The results above refer to average trade effects over the entire course of CU member-
ship. However, CU effects may not be constant over time.The mere announcement of
a future accession might already anticipate trade increases and beneﬁts of CU mem-
bership might continue to accrue over time.The evolution of the CU effect over time
can be further examined by separating the average CU dummy into time periods that
identify the pre-accession, accession, and post accession periods. Since a number of
countries exit CUs in our sample, we can also identify secession effects.
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riates remain largely unchanged, the CU regressor shows clear evidence of accession
dynamics.We focus on our preferred speciﬁcation,regression (4A),since analog regres-
sion (1A), which omits unobserved heterogeneity controls, shows again some signs of
misspeciﬁcation.
The pre-accession effect, measured during the ﬁve years before joining the CU, is
negligible and even negative, if unobserved bilateral heterogeneity is ignored.







Adj R2 0.743 0.867
F-statistic vs regression 1 4




Pre-accession (t–1) (0.179) (0.098)
CUmxt 0.081 0.305***
Accession (t) (0.102) (0.114)
CUmxt 0.981*** 0.525***
Post-accession (t + 1, n) (0.145) (0.140)
CUmxt 0.548*** 0.092
Post-secession (n + 1) (0.175) (0.130)
CUmxt -0.007 -0.147
Post-secession (n + 2) (0.157) (0.139)
CBmxt 0.195 0.652***
(Catch-all for CBs) (0.157) (0.249)
PTAmxt 0.609*** 0.440***
(Catch-all for PTAs) (0.097) (0.053)
Fxvolatility -0.007 -0.007
(Ex. rate volatility) (0.008) (0.007)
CurColonymxt 0.690*** 0.046












(Log of distance) (0.021)
Notes: *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. Standard errors (clustered by
country-pairs) in parentheses.
a The average effect (estimated in Table 1) is inserted into this table for comparison purposes.
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The largest trade effects are reserved,however,for the post-accession phase,indicating
that the beneﬁts of CUs accrue over time.The post-accession CU effect is estimated to
be nearly 70% (ª e
0.525 - 1),and shows clearly that the average CU effect is a composite
of the weaker CU accession effect and the stronger CU post-accession effect.When a
country leaves a CU, its trade swiftly reverts to its expected level and no signiﬁcant
trade creation remains observable.Interestingly,currency boards become more signiﬁ-
cant, when we control for accession dynamics.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
It is common in the CU literature to provide extensive sensitivity analysis to explore a
range of alternative speciﬁcations.Through ﬁve perturbations to our preferred regres-
sions, our sensitivity analysis covers virtually all remaining variables proposed by
earlier literature.
13 Our ﬁrst perturbation follows Rose (2005) and adds regressors for
membership in the three international organizations intended to promote trade:
GATT/WTO, IMF and OEEC/OECD.
14 Our second perturbation adds two measures
of factor endowment differences from Frankel et al. (1995) to proxy for Heckscher–
Ohlin trade.These two measures are the absolute log differences in per capita GDP and
population density.In the third and fourth perturbations,we drop FX volatility and the
CB variables. The omission of FX volatility extends our dataset back to 1950 and
increases the number of observations by roughly ten thousand. Finally, our ﬁfth per-
turbation adopts a broader CU deﬁnition (as in Glick and Rose, 2002), which deﬁnes
trade ﬂows between spokes in hub-spoke arrangements also as CU-internal.
Table 3 presents the robustness results for the aggregate CU effect with and without
additional unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls.All regressions expand on the
baseline regressions (1) and (4) but include the entire disaggregated set of individual
PTAs. The implied trade increases are 42–47% for our preferred speciﬁcation and
117–135% for the version without unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls. Our
preferred estimate of the average CU effect thus remains unambiguously on the order
of 50%.
Table 4 presents robustness for the individual CU effects. To conserve space, it
focuses exclusively on our preferred speciﬁcation with simultaneous multilateral resist-
ance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls.That is, all results in Table 4 are
direct variants of regression (6). Like the aggregate CU impacts in Table 3, individual
CU impacts are concentrated in narrow intervals.The CFA franc is estimated between
96% and 123%, slightly skewed around our 97% benchmark. Interestingly, the CFA
coefﬁcient rises in both magnitude and signiﬁcance when we control for factor endow-
ment differences (which, according to our results, increase bilateral trade). The euro
trade effect also remains robust at 34–40%. Likewise, British pound and other/extinct
CUs’ effects hardly change.Our conclusion that dollarization does not improve trading
relations with the USA also remains intact.The US dollar CU impacts remain negative
and even turn statistically signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations.
7. Conclusion
The introduction of the euro raised interest in quantifying the trade effects associated
with CUs. Early estimates suggested a tripling of trade because of CUs. While subse-
quent studies ﬁnd smaller effects, most large panel studies still imply trade effects of
430 Theo S. Eicher and Christian Henn
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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltdover 100%. Baldwin (2006) surveyed this literature and derived appropriate gravity
model controls to assess the trade effect of CUs.He noted that previous studies neglect
to control simultaneously for unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral trade relationships
as well as for multilateral-resistance general-equilibrium effects.
We implement Baldwin’s econometric speciﬁcation to provide an updated bench-
mark of the original Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002) results.Three important
results emerge:ﬁrst,the proper use of controls reduces omitted variable bias and lowers
the magnitudes but not the signiﬁcance of average CU trade effects.Second,individual
CUs generate distinctly different trade effects,so coefﬁcients that average over all CUs
might produce misleading results. Finally, we ﬁnd that trade effects of PTAs generally
exceed those of CUs,although latter remain important drivers of trade and many cases.
For the Eurozone, our results attribute a key share of recent trade increases to the
introduction of the euro.
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Notes
1. The latter approach acknowledges that variations in the relative prices of trading partners
matter for trade, but assumes that a country’s price vector and trade costs with the rest of the
world remain constant over time.
2. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) ﬁrst emphasized such unobserved bilateral heterogeneity by
including country-pair ﬁxed effects in the estimation. Recent CU papers that also include these
ﬁxed effects are Glick and Rose (2002), Pakko and Wall (2001), and Klein and Shambaugh
(2006).
3. Their dataset holds only 4837 observations to serve as an example,compared to Rose’s (2000),
which featured 22,948 observations, or ours (76,081 observations). Baldwin and Taglioni specu-
late the implausible negative effect is the result of insufﬁcient cross-sectional variation.However,
when they add data (back to 1980) to address the high standard errors, their euro coefﬁcient is
small, positive, and insigniﬁcant.
4. The dimension of the dataset matters for three important reasons. First, previous studies
report an average CU trade effect, but coverage of different years implies the inclusion of
different CUs. Second, datasets that cover only subsets of countries (e.g. OECD) exclude the
effects of important CUs such as the Central African Franc (CFA) in the average effect.Third,
the longer the time series, the more precise are the estimates of other trade ﬂow determinants
before and after CU accession, which allows for a more precise estimate of the CU effect.
5. Glick and Rose reduce the effect to 91% (ª e0.65 - 1) by introducing country-pair ﬁxed effects
alone.
6. PTAs included are bilateral PTAs (BilateralPTAmxt), North America FTA (NAFTAmxt), Euro-
pean Union (EUmxt), Central American Common Market (CACMmxt), Caribbean Community
(CARICOMmxt), Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSURmxt),Association of South East
Asian Nations FTA (AFTAmxt), Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (ANZCERTAmxt), South Paciﬁc Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agree-
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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltdment (SPARTECAmxt), European Economic Area (EEAmxt), European Free Trade Association
(EFTAmxt),Andean Community/Pact (APmxt), Latin America Integration Agreement (LAIAmxt),
and Asia Paciﬁc Economic Community (APECmxt).
7. For example, political relationships, networks of business leaders, transport infrastructure,
cultural afﬁnities, and institutional similarities.
8. Soloaga and Winters (2001) examined nine PTAs (1982–1996) and reported effects ranging
from an 8% increase (EU) to 17-fold increases (CACM). Following the convention of the
literature, we refer to a “percent increase in trade,” while the exact terminology would be the
“average percent increase in trade for the years of CU membership” for member countries.
Eicher et al. (2011) examined 12 PTAs and found effects ranging from 60% (EEA) to ﬁve-fold
increases (CACM). Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) conducted a meta analysis for 75 studies that
cover nineteen PTAs to ﬁnd estimates to range from an astonishing 2000% increase (Baltic PTA)
to a 29% decrease (Canada–USA FTA). Frankel (2010) surveyed the literature on CU trade
impacts and reported EMU effects ranging from 14% to 40% (in Chintrakarn,2008;and Bun and
Klaassen, 2002, respectively), while CFA is reported to have increased trade by 8%.
9. As outlined in the data section,further differences lie in (1) the speciﬁcation of the dependent
variable (unidirectional trade ﬂow data vs Rose’s bidirectional), (2) time frame (1950–2000 vs
1970–1990 in Rose),and (3) we additionally insert a currency board dummy,which has,however,
no impact on the results.
10. Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Hsiao (1986, p. 50) showed how coefﬁcients of time-
invariant regressors that have been absorbed into the ﬁxed effects can be recaptured.The process
involves a two-stage procedure where the ﬁrst stage is given by (4) and the second stage uses the
estimated country-pair ﬁxed effect coefﬁcients as dependent variables and time-invariant regres-
sors as explanatory variables.
11. This is due to the number of ﬁxed effects being large in all dimensions and to the panel being
unbalanced. We use the “FEiLSDVj” estimation procedure of Andrews et al. (2006), which is
based on partitioned regression techniques.
12. The magnitude of the CU coefﬁcient produced by the speciﬁcation in regression (4) is not
signiﬁcantly different from the coefﬁcients produced when we use Rose’s original sample period
(see robustness analysis in Table 3).
13. All other variables that were included in our analysis above are now absorbed into the ﬁxed
effects.
14. GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO = World Trade Organization,
IMF = International Monetary Fund, OEEC = Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Data on
GATT/WTO membership are taken from Subramanian and Wei (2007). Data on IMF and
OEEC/OECD membership are taken from these institutions’ websites at www.imf.org and
www.oecd.org, respectively.
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